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STATE ENFORCEMENT OF RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY CHARITABLE TRUSTS
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
I. ITRMODUCTION
In numerous cases decided under the equal protection clause,
the United States Supreme Court has stated that private
discrimination is not constitutionally impermissible. Typical is
the language in iShelley v. Ki'aemer1 that, "the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the ac-
tion inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.
That Amendment erects no shield against merely private con-
duct, however discriminatory or wrongful."
(The purpose of this note is to examine the charitable trust,
a private means of transferring wealth which is pervaded by
public interest; and, more particularly, to consider whether the
fourteenth amendment may be used successfully to regulate the
purpose of the charitable donor because of the involment of
state enforcement of charitable trustS.2 There has been no Su-
preme Court decision bearing directly on this point; however,
there are several cases in closely related areas from which
analogies may be drawn in an attempt to provide some measure
of predictability with regard to this question.
IT. STATE MlEANS OF ENFOROEMENT
Enforcement of charitable trusts varies in method and extent
from state to state and is largely regulated by statutes. However,
some state courts have held that the right of enforcement by the
state, through action of its attorney general, was accorded by
common law.3 In South Carolina, the Attorney General's rights
1. 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The Court went on to find impermissible state
involvement, however, for reasons which will be discussed in a later section
of this note.
2. The scope of this note will not include a consideration of state provided
tax exemptions and other state involvement in charitable trusts except insofar
as common principles involved may overlap.
3. See Note, The Attorney General and the Charitable Trust Act-Wills,
Contest and Construction, 14 CLtv. MAn. L. REv. 194 (1965) and Note, The
Enforcement of Charitable Trusts, 18 SYRAcusE L. Ray. 613 (1967). One state
court (Kentucky) in Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W2d
947 (Ky. 1959), held that the attorney general had no right, in absence of
statute, to intervene in a will contest action. For a study of the involvement of
state courts' powers to construe and enforce charitable trusts, see Note, The
Enforcement of Charitable Trusts In America: A History of Evolving Social
Attitudes, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 436 (1968).
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and duties to represent the public interest in charitable trusts are
governed by statute. S. C. CODE A-ww. § 1-240 (1962) provides
that "[t]he Attorney General shall enforce the due application
of funds given . . . to public charities within the State, [and]
prevent breaches of trust in the administration thereof .... , 4
More specific duties are stated in S. C. CODE ANN. § 67-83 (1962)
which demands that:
[u]pon the failure of the trustees to discharge their
duties under this chapter, or when it appears that trus-
tees are not properly discharging the duties imposed
upon them by the trust, the Attorney General shall
bring an action to compel their compliance with this
chapter or to compel them to discharge the duties im-
posed upon them by trust, as the case may be.
It would seem that the Attorney General must be a party
in every proceeding affecting the public's interest in a charitable
trust before a binding adjudication can be reached adverse to
the public interest."
III. STATE INVOLVEMENT AND Tm FouRTEErm H A=rENDMENT
In considering whether or not the state's enforcement of
charitable trusts which have discriminatory provisions provides
a sufficient amount of state action or involvement to submit the
trust to the dictates of the equal protection clause it is
necessary to examine developments by the Supreme Court in
related areas and to draw analogies where they may be found,
for, as stated above, the precise question at hand has not been
squarely dealt with by the Court. As will be seen, in all the
Supreme Court cases dealing with discriminatory charitable
trusts there have been one or more added elements of state
involvement beyond the mere duty of the Attorney General to
enforce. Generally, the relevant cases can be divided into two
categories, those evidencing direct or official involvement and
those evidencing judicial involvement.
4. Furman University v. McLeod, 238 S.C. 475, 120 S.E2d 865 (1961)
interpreted S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-240 (1952), of which the present statute is a
reinactment, to mean that the Attorney General is a proper party in the
enforcement of charitable trusts to protect the interests of the public at large.
In Furman there was a suit against the Attorney General as the named de-
fendant to determine the effect of language in a deed in the school's chain of
title.
5. See, e.g., In Re Pruver's Estate, 390 Pa. 529, 136 A.2d 107 (1957).
[Vol. 22
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A. Direct or Official Involvement
Many of the equal protection cases decided in trust and
analogous areas involve some form of direct participation by
the state, and, of course, here the Court has had the least amount
of trouble in applying the fourteenth amendment. In Penn-
sylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts," also known as
the Girard case, Steven Girard bequeathed a fund in trust for
"poor white male orphans" and named the City of Philadelphia
as trustee. Pursuant to legislative enactment,7 the trust was ad-
ministered by the Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City
of Philadelphia, an agency of the State of Pennsylvania. The
Court, in a decision, held that the refusal by the Board to admit
Negro applicants was discrimination prohibited by the four-
teenth amendment.8 While the Court did not elaborate on the
rationale of its decision9 it can fairly be said that in Girard an
agency of the state had adopted a policy of discrimination in
conformity with the dictates of the will of Stephen Girard.
A state was also involved in the administration of a charitable
trust in Evans v. Newton.10 Here United States Senator
Augustus 0. Bacon devised a tract of land to the Mayor and
Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, for use as a park for
white people only. When it became evident to the city that it
could not continue to operate the park on a segregated basis it
had a Georgia Court appoint private individuals as trustees in
place of the city, presumably so that discrimination in the park
could continue. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, said
that the park had been an integral part of the City of Macon's
activities and that "[tihe momentum it acquired as a public
facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appoint-
ment of 'private' trustees."'" Many charitable trusts are also
involved with the activities of cities since they provide for
schools, hospitals, and other facilities which cities normally
furnish; however, the Evans Court's opinion seems to be focused
upon the fact that there was a firmly established tradition of
6. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
7. PA. LAws No. 1258, p. 1276 § 1 (1869), now codified as PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 16365 (1957).
8. The Court remanded the case to the state court for further proceedings.
These proceedings will be examined in the next section under Judicial In-
volvement.
9. The opinion of the Court was only a page and a half long in the
Supreme Court Reporter, and the only discrimination case cited was Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
11. Id. at 301.
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municipal control rather than upon the fact that parks perform
a public function.
In providing criteria for predicting the outcome of closer
cases such as ones in which the state's involvement is minimal,
the Court's dicta is perhaps more interesting than its holding.
Justice Douglas said, "[i]f a testator wanted to leave a school
or center for the use of one race only and in no way implicated
the State in the supervision, control, or management of that
facility, we assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty
would be encountered."' While Justice Douglas clearly wishes
to reserve decision on this point, his words strongly suggest that
the fact that Senator Bacon voluntarily involved the state in
his discriminatory scheme may have been an important factor
without which the fourteenth amendment dictates may not have
been required. This idea was also seen in Kerr ,v. Enoch Pratt
Free Library'2 where the donor, Enoch Pratt, built a library
and gave it to the City of Baltimore under the operation of
private trustees. The court said that while the donor could
have created a private corporation to effectuate his purpose, he
instead chose to involve the City of Baltimore in his scheme and
thereby subjected it to the confinements of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
While in both of the above cases there was pervasive state
involvement, the concept of voluntariness may well be relevant
to the case of minimal state involvement. In the above cases
the donor did an affirmative act to involve the state. Where the
only state involvement is through the duty of the attorney
general to enforce the trust there is no, call made by the donor
upon the state to become involved. Here the state would become
involved only because of the importance of charitable trusts to
the public. This factor, in addition to the minimal state con-
nection involved, might provide a rationale for a holding that
the equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination in
all charitable trusts.
In E vans v. Newton there was another factor which the Court
did not find it necessary to consider but which may lead to a
finding of state action if considered by the Court. This factor is
state encouragement of the coercion of discrimination. In Evans
v. Newton there was a state statute' 4 which permitted any
12. Id. at 300.
13. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
14. Acts of 1905, p. 117 (now codified in GA. CODE AxN. § 69-504 (1967)).
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person to grant land to a municipal corporation in trust for
the use of the public on a segregated basis. It was argued that
this statute had a coercive effect and implicated Georgia in
racial discrimination because of the statute's clarification of
a previously uncertain area of Georgia trust law.
State encouragement has been dealt with by the Supreme Court
in other areas of racial discrimination. In Peterson v. City of
Greenville1 5 there was a city ordinance requiring separate
eating facilities for whites and Negroes, and several Negroes
were arrested upon complaint of the manager of the Green-
ville, South Carolina, S. H. Kress store for violating the
trespass laws of the state. The Court refused to hear the
contention of the state that the manager would have dis-
criminated without the existence of the ordinance because it
found that the state had become significantly involved and thus
had removed the decision of whether or not to discriminate from
the sphere of private choice.16 Slightly more subtle coercion
was involved in Lombard v. Louisiana 7 where the Court found
that the discrimination practiced by managers of a McCrory
Five and Ten Cent Store conformed to state policy and practice
and was influenced by orders of the city police chief. State
coercion was also found in Robinson 'v. Florida'8 where the
Court ruled that Florida Board of Health regulations providing
for separate bathroom facilities in integrated eating facilities
effectively discouraged integration of such facilities and thus
constituted unconstitutional state involvement.
It would seem that if a racially discriminatory charitable
trust is attacked on the basis of the state's duty to enforce the
trust one of the main arguments advanced would be that such a
state statute or policy influenced or encouraged the discrimina-
tion. Indeed, in his concurring opinion'9 in Evans v. Newton,
Justice White would have based the decision of the Court on the
involvement of the state through its statute permitting discrimi-
natory charitable trusts; and Justice Brennan, in his dissent
in E vans v. Abney,20 would find that the same Georgia statute
was one of the factors requiring a finding of unconstitutional
state involvement in the devise of the property for use as a
segregated park. The attorney general's involvement differs
,15. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
16. Id. at 248.
17. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
18. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
19. 282 U.S. at 302.
20. 90 S.Ct. 628, 636 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
1970] NoTms
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in its essential nature from the involvement of the state in
Peterson, Lombard, and Robinson, and even from the involve-
ment in Evans v. Newton. The attorney general's involvement
results from purely neutral state statutes intended to protect the
public interest in charitable trusts. The statutes involved neither
mention nor affirmatively encourage discrimination. They
merely provide for the attorney general to enforce any and
every charitable trusts regardless of its terms. This neutrality of
the attorney general's involvement could very well be the
decisive factor in a Supreme Court decision on the issue raised
in this note.
Perhaps a better idea of the Court's view of state involvement
can be derived from an examination of Griffin v. Maryland2-
where the trespass conviction of five Negroes was reversed. Here
a private amusement park operator hired a security guard with
specific instructions to refuse to admit Negroes. The operator
also had the guard deputized as a sheriff, presumably so that he
would have tl~e power to arrest trespassers and troublemakers.
The Court held that the state was unconstitutionally involved
when its sheriff arrested the Negroes because the sheriff had
adopted discrimination as his own policy. The Court was
careful to distinguish this situation from the permissible situa-
tion in which the police would be called to arrest Negro tres-
passers because of the discrimination of the owner of the prop-
erty. The duties of the attorney general would seem to be much
more analogous to the situation of the police being called to
arrest trespassers than to that of the property owner having a
sheriff in his employ with instructions to exclude all Negroes.
Also worthy of consideration is the Court's decision in Reitman
v. Mulkey.22 The California legislature between 1959 and 1963
had enacted a series of statutes designed to prohibit racial
discrimination in many areas. In 1964 California adopted an
amendment to the California Constitution which overturned the
previous statutes. The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
found that the state's repeal of its laws constituted an uncon-
stitutional authorization and encouragement of discrimination.
It is very interesting to note that, of the five Justices23 who
constituted the majority, two are no longer members of the
21. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
22. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
23. Chief Justice Warren, justices Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and White.
Of these five, Justices Warren and Fortas are no longer on the Court.
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Court, since there was a very strong dissent by four members2 4
of the Court, only one of whom is not presently sitting. The
dissenting members, represented by Justice Harlan, said that
"[a] state enactment, particularly one that is simply permissive
of private decision-making rather than coercive ... should not
be struck down by the judiciary under the Equal Protection
Clause without persuasive evidence of an invidious purpose or
effect."25 The dissenting members said that the test to be used
in cases of private discrimination was, as stated in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,26 "whether the State has be-
come 'a joint participant in the challenged activity, which,
on that account, cannot be considered to have been so purely
private as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' ,,27 Even if the dissenting opinion does not now represent
the opinion of a majority of the Court it would seem that the
duty of an attorney general to enforce all charitable trusts
would not run afoul of the then majority in Reitman.
The concept of neutrality can further be seen through an
examination of the cases which will be discussed in the next
section involving the states' judicial systems.
B. Judicial InvoZvement
The question of the effect of judicial involvement in private
discrimination is one of the most unsettled areas in the equal
protection field. One reason for this is the Supreme Court's
decision of Shelley v. Kraemer.28 In Shelley a number of land-
owners had signed an agreement which purported to restrict the
sale of land to members of the Caucasian race and which was
to bind subsequent purchasers. When one landowner tried to
sell his land to a Negro, the others objected, and a suit was
brought to enforce the covenant. The Supreme Court, reviewing
the state court's enforcement of the agreement, held that the
state's judicial involvement violated the equal protection clause.
After reiterating the rubric that the fourteenth amendment is
limited to ". . . only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States[,] '2 9 the Court said that here the state "made
available ... the full coercive power of government to deny to
24. Justices Harlan, Black, Clark, and Stewart. Justice Clark is not pres-
ently on the Court.
25. 387 U.S. at 391.
26. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
27. 387 U.S. at 392 (dissenting opinlon quoting Burton).
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. Id. at 13.
19701 NoTs
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petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of
property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing
to sell." 80
The expansiveness of the holding and statements of the Court
in Shelley seem to indicate that state enforcement of discrimi-
natory charitable trusts will be swept into the grasps of the
equal protection clause. However, this may not be so. Perhaps
because the Court felt itself being drawn into a position which
would ban all private discrimination, it has not given any
indication of an intention to apply Shelley beyond its facts.
The Shelley Court placed emphasis upon the facts that there
were willing purchasers and sellers and that the very right of
ownership of property was involved. In several more recent
cases it seems that the Court declined the opportunity to expand
its position in Shelley or perhaps even impliedly overruled it.
In In re Girard College Trusteeship31 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania was confronted with the Supreme Court's
remand of the Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City
Trust 83 2 case. Upon remand, the Pennsylvania court in turn
remanded the case to the Pennsylvania Orphans' Court which
removed the Board of City Trusts and substituted thirteen
private citizens who had no connection with the state govern-
ment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the action of
the Orphans' Court against the attack that this constituted state
action and thereby violated the equal protection clause. The
court distinguished Shelley on the grounds that here there was
no general right of the public to share in the benefaction and
that there was an important right of Stephen Girard to control
the disposition of his property. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari33 in 1958, ten years after its decision in Shelley. Of
course, eight years after In re Girard the Court decided Evans
v. Newton3 4 in which Justice Douglas, after deciding the case on
the grounds of public function and municipal control, said,
"state courts that aid private parties to perform that public
function on a segregated basis implicate the State in conduct
proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment."35  However the
30. Id. at 19.
31. 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
32. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
33. 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
34. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
35. Id. at 302.
[Vol. 22
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NoTEs
Court does not seem to base its decision on judicial involvement,
but rather upon the municipal control idea.
The concept of neutrality is best developed in the line of
cases involving the state judiciary in Evans v. Abney."6 There
the Georgia Supreme Court had refused to apply the ey pres
doctrine to reform Senator Bacon's will to allow the admission
of Negroes to the park created by the will because it found that
the segregation of the park was an essential and inseparable part
of the testator's plan. Since the condition of the trust could not
be met because of the Court's holdings in Evans v. Newton, the
Georgia Court allowed the property to revert to Senator Bacon's
heirs. Upon consideration of the Georgia Court's involvement,
the Supreme Court held that the refusal to apply the ey pres
doctrine and the allowal of the reversion to Senator Bacon's
heirs did not violate the equal protection clause. Of primary
importance in the Court's decision were the facts that the
state's cy pres laws were neutral with regard to race and of long
standing, that there was no proof that any of the Georgia judges
were motivated by discriminatory intent, and that the Senator's
racial restrictions were solely the product of his own social
philosophy. Rather than expressly overruling Shelley v. Krae-
mer the Court stated that it was distinguishable because here
the park was completely eliminated and the loss shared equally
by both white and Negro. However, the Court really seemed to
ignore Shelley v. Kraemer more than attempt to distinguish it.
So, twenty-two years after its decision in Shelley the Court
seems to be making a more recent pronouncement of its philoso-
phy in this immediate area. Justice Black, writing for the
majority, said, "[t]he responsibility of this Court... is to con-
strue and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they
are and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own
personal inclinations."3 7 Of course this statement is weakened a
bit by the fact that it seems to reflect Justice Black's personal
beliefs and may not represent those of the other four members
of the majority.38
Admittedly, the attorney general's involvement in enforcing
discriminatory charitable trusts is not precisely analogous to
the court's involvement in Abney, largely because the court in
36. 90 S.Ct. 628 (1970).
37. Id. at 635.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White com-
prised the majority, while Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented and Jus-
tice Marshall took no part in the consideration of the case.
1970]
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Abney did eliminate the park. However, very strong analogies
do exist. The statutes requiring the attorney general to enforce
charitable trusts are entirely neutral as to race. The attorney
general merely enforces a charitable trust which happens to
contain a discriminatory provision, and his actions are certainly
not the result of, or motivated by, any personal discriminatory
intent. If it can be said that the actions of the attorney general
fall somewhere between the ". . . active intervention of the
state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power..., 39
as expressed in Shdley v. Kraemer and the findings of the
Georgia court in Evans v. Abney, then it would seem that the
closeness of the situation to Abney, coupled with the fact that
Shelley v. Kraemer and Abney do not differ greatly on their
facts, and that Abney is a much more recent pronouncement in
the area require that the problem posed-that of the attorney
general's involvement-be treated analogously to Abney.
IV. PoLrcIMs INVOLVED
Certainly, no matter what course the Court decides to take in
its resolution of this question, there are a number of policies
which will bear on its decision and may or may not appear in
the wording of the case itself. The first of these is suggested by
Justice Douglas in Evans v. Newton in which he says,
[t]here are two complementary principles to be recon-
ciled in this case. One is the right of the individual to
pick his own associates so as to express his preferences
and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining
such clubs and groups as he chooses. The other is the
constitutional ban in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored
racial inequality .... "40
In the case of the charitable trust the Court will have to balance
the right of disposition of property against the equal protection
rights. Professor Louis Henkin has suggested that Shelley v.
Kraemer is indeed valid but that it must give way in special
cases where rights of basic liberty outweigh equal protection
rights.41 The rights of Negroes to be beneficiaries of a charitable
39. 334 U.S. at 19. See also, Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEXAs L. REv. 347 (1963).
40. 382 U.S. at 298.
41. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For A Revised OpWnion, 110 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 473 (1962).
[Vol. 22
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trust would seem weak compared with society's rights of owner-
ship and free disposition of property.
Another policy to be considered is also raised by Shelley.
There the Court found that the private restrictions were per-
fectly permissible but that they could not be enforced through
the court system. Professor Wechsler of Columbia University
School of Law condemns the opinion for banning judicial
enforcement of something that individuals have the right to
do.42 It would be a very undesirable situation if individuals
were lead to take enforcement of their private rights into their
own hands. For this reason the Court may feel that it went too
far in Shelley. It does seem that in Abney the Court has re-
treated somewhat. If the Court had found state action in Abney
it would be very difficult to think of a situation, including the
enforcement of charitable trusts, where state action could not
also be found.
The importance of charitable giving and the part that it
plays in our society might lead the Court to refrain from regu-
lating this area.43 Another reason that has been suggested for
non-regulation is that a finding of state action in this area might
hurt Negroes more than help them since many racially
discriminatory charitable trusts discriminate in favor of Negroes.
Of course these would be subjected to the same constitutional
decision which would affect those which discriminate in favor
of whites. The opponents of racially discriminatory charitable
trusts argue that they disrupt the concept of charitable giving
44
and that they detract more from society than they help it. Thus
they should not be protected45 from the mandates of the equal
protection clause.
V. CONOLU ION
As is clear from a review of the above discussed cases, the
equal protection clause has spawned a great deal of litigation
which is neither clear nor easy to synthesize. It appears, more
here than in almost any other area of the law, that the Court
does not state the true bases for its decisions; rather it seeks to
42. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA~v.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
43. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and The Will
of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957).
44. See Parker, Evans v. Newton and The Racially Restricted Charitable
Trust, 13 How. L.J. 223 (1967).
45. Powers, The Racially DTscriminatory Charitable Trust: A Suggested
Treatment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 478 (1965).
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justify conclusions which were reached by methods other than
strict legal construction. This is what makes a prediction in the
area of discriminatory charitable trusts difficult. The best that
can be done is to try to guage the unexpressed position of the
Court through its recent pronouncements. Whatever the Court
ultimately decides, whether to follow the ShelMy v. Kraemer
rationale or the Evans v. Ablney neutrality rationale, it will have
adequate precedent with which to justify its decision. The most
recent pronouncement of the Court, Abney, would seem to lead
to a conclusion that the attorney general's duty to enforce a
racially discriminatory charitable trust does not constitute im-
permissible state action in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Jom C. B. SmTH, JR.
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